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“LAWCRAFT”: CHINA’S EVOLVING
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY
Captain Matthew H. Ormsbee*
INTRODUCTION
As enthusiasm for the modern Pax Americana1 budded, bloomed, and
now, by many accounts, withers, the United States must grudgingly reckon
with its waning influence in a world that turns increasingly to China as a
rising superpower.2 The coming years will likely provide an answer to the
burning question of whether China will outpace the United States as a
superpower, and, if so, how the United States can safeguard its national
security in an environment in which it is no longer the uncontested world
leader. The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy orients defense
* Captain Matthew H. Ormsbee is a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, currently serving as the Area Defense Counsel at Misawa Air
Base, Japan; J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., Hendrix College. Opinions,
conclusions, and recommendations expressed are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of
its components.
1. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline
Became
Inevitable,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
26,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-howwestern-decline-became-inevitable/256388/ [https://perma.cc/WE2H-ZDQS] (defining Pax
Americana as “the post-1945 international order . . . in which the United States employed its
overwhelming power to shape and direct global events”).
2. See, e.g., Dan Balz, America’s Global Standing is at a Low Point. The Pandemic
Made
It
Worse.,
WASH.
POST
(July
26,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/reckoning-america-world-standinglow-point/ [https://perma.cc/2XGN-QHGQ] (noting that, “[i]n this climate, China’s
leadership has gained a larger advantage in the ‘great power competition,’ and the other player,
Russia, is now on a more even level with the U.S.”); see also STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2020:
INTO A NEW ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION 186 (Thomas F. Lynch III ed. 2020)
(describing the shift in the global balance of power, in particular: “While major aims have
remained consistent, the power differential between Washington and Beijing has changed over
the past 20 years. It has moved in Beijing’s favor in terms of economic influence and selected
measures of conventional military power, most notably in areas near China.”); ANONYMOUS,
THE LONGER TELEGRAM: TOWARD A NEW AMERICAN CHINA STRATEGY 16 (ATL. COUNCIL
2021) [hereinafter “THE LONGER TELEGRAM”], https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/The-Longer-Telegram-Toward-A-New-American-ChinaStrategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KHZ-5PN8] (stating that “[t]here is a subtle yet corrosive
force that has been at work in the United States’ national psychology for some time now,
raising doubt about the nation’s future and encouraging a sense that, as a country, America’s
best days may now be in the past”).
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professionals toward long-term strategic measures as adversaries’
capabilities gradually match or exceed American capabilities.3 In this
context, the United States is in a tug-of-war with China as our primary pacing
challenge.4
As China’s economy and military swell, the U.S. Department of Defense
can view strategic competition through the traditional lens of military
maneuvers. Yet, strategic competition in the form of legal maneuvers
deserves much greater attention. The Chinese Communist Party will
continue to use lawfare against adversaries; but, increasingly, it will rely on
“lawcraft,” a more threatening offshoot of lawfare that is characterized by
conjured interpretations of law more akin to witchcraft than statecraft.5
China’s embrace of lawcraft denotes the use of law as a tool of subterfuge to
mislead and coerce adversaries, particularly in clashes over territorial rights,
maritime entitlements, and anti-access/area denial abilities.6 In this respect,
China will wield international law as a sword to extend its might, justify its
rise, and outdo the United States, while engaging in conflict just below the
threshold of traditional war.7 How exactly China does so and how the United
States can use law as a shield will determine how robustly the United States
can compete long-term to achieve its national security objectives.
This Article confronts a key question of our time: as the United States’s
global power slowly ebbs and China’s power incrementally grows without
resort to armed conflict, is the international system for peaceful dispute
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SHARPENING THE AMERICAN MILITARY’S COMPETITIVE EDGE 1
(expressly stating that “[i]nter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary
concern in U.S. national security”).
4. WHITE HOUSE, INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 6 (2021)
(underlining the challenges inherent in a “growing rivalry with China”).
5. “Lawfare” is a term popularized by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S.A.F.
(Ret.), to describe “the use of law as a weapon of war.” See The Meaning of Lawfare,
LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/topic/meaning-lawfare [https://perma.cc/9MPS3TC7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military
Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st [Century] Conflicts (Nov. 29, 2001),
http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2KD-BRRH]; see also Robert
Williams, International Law with Chinese Characteristics: Beijing and the “Rules-Based”
Global Order, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201012_international_law_china_williams.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8E3F-6CUK] (stating that “China exhibits a flexible and functional
approach to international law that enables it to benefit from and exploit the international order
without the need to advocate fundamental changes to the letter of the law in most areas”).
6. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “is an attempt to deny an adversary’s freedom of
movement on the battlefield. Anti-access—of enemy military movement into an area of
operations—utilizes attack aircraft, warships, and specialized ballistic and cruise missiles
designed to strike key targets. Area denial—denial of enemy freedom of action in areas under
friendly control—employs more defensive means such as air and sea defense systems.”
China’s Anti-Access Area Denial, MISSILE DEF. ADVOC. ALL. (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missilethreat/china/china-anti-access-area-denial/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/XH7J-FVJ7].
7. See Michael J. Mazarr, This Is Not a Great Power Competition: Why the Term
Doesn’t
Capture
Today’s
Reality,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(May
29,
2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-05-29/not-great-power-competition
[https://perma.cc/6H25-YUJH].
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resolution resilient enough to contain potential Chinese abuses and preserve
American values? Part I provides background on the liberal world order
following World War II and China’s special status as an increasingly
assertive autocracy. Part II addresses dispute settlement in the context of
respect for rule of law, particularly as it relates to a high-profile arbitration
proceeding that the Philippines brought against China. Finally, Part III puts
forth several solutions to combat lawcraft and secure U.S. national security
interests in an increasingly Sinocentric world.
I. CHINA’S POWER GAINS AS AMERICA’S AUTHORITY WANES
A. Relative American Atrophy
Following World War II, the United States relished in its historic victory
and emerged as the flagbearer of a new international order.8 The United
States was largely unchallenged as a great power for decades during the Pax
Americana, enabling it to establish a norms-based liberal world order based
on democratic legal principles.9 The post-Cold War era of international
relations, coinciding roughly with President Bill Clinton’s first term, is
commonly dubbed a unipolar moment in history in which the United States
was the unquestioned world power.10 From 2006 to 2008, however, this
chapter started to near its end, and by 2014, the United States found itself in
a fundamentally different situation of great power competition with China
and Russia.11 In the following years, China has repeatedly questioned and
weakened the American-led international order that has flourished since
World War II.12
If the United States’s international might and influence is indeed waning
as many experts believe, then our national security apparatus should
increasingly rely on a sturdy architecture of international law and dispute
resolution to uphold global norms and rights.13 This should take center stage
as a vital part of U.S. grand strategy, thereby curbing potential legal abuses

8. See generally Thomas Wright, The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-freeworld-trump-authoritarianism/569881 [https://perma.cc/U3ED-HZMA].
9. See id.
10. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL43838, RENEWED GREAT POWER
COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE—ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (Oct. 7, 2021),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK42-KLPA].
11. See id.
12. See generally Eric Sayers, Commentary, Thoughts on the Unfolding U.S.-Chinese
Competition: Washington’s Policy Towards Beijing Enters Its Next Phase, WAR ON THE
ROCKS (Feb. 9, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/thoughts-on-the-unfolding-u-schinese-competition-washingtons-policy-towards-beijing-enters-its-next-phase
[https://perma.cc/2CJA-AWFB] (stating that “China’s predatory and coercive behavior under
President Xi Jinping has increased rapidly in recent years, targeted against Uighur Muslims,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Australia, Japan, and others”).
13. See id.
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by China and “preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.”14
Should China achieve regional hegemony, American policymakers might
take solace in the fact that unarmed disputes could conceivably be resolved
in favor of the United States on the basis of legal arguments rather than
resorting to armed conflict. This issue is all the more vital as China’s
priorities often conflict with the United States’s priorities, and China grows
more comfortable dictating the terms of the global agenda.15
B. Chinese Ascendency
Central to China’s ascendency is its economic engine.16 Its economy has
expanded exponentially for decades, notching nearly 10 percent gross
domestic product (GDP) growth per year since 1978.17 In terms of GDP,
China has become the second largest global economy behind only the United
States, accounting for 18 percent of global GDP.18 At least one expert
believes that China will surpass the United States as the largest global
economy in the near future.19 Today, China is the largest merchandise
trading partner of sixty-four countries, including Germany; the United States
counts only thirty-eight countries.20 In addition, since the global financial
crisis of 2008, China has exceeded all other countries in terms of
contributions to world economic growth, seizing headlines and burnishing its
image as a benevolent economic overseer.21 Although the COVID-19
pandemic momentarily dampened the Chinese economy, within a year it
came back stronger than ever.22

14. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10485, DEFENSE PRIMER: GEOGRAPHY, STRATEGY, AND
U.S.
FORCE
DESIGN
1
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10485/12 [https://perma.cc/6ZQM-UBTW].
15. See THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 31 (“If this is an accurate account of
Xi’s core interests, then it is a separate exercise to determine which of them are compatible
with US interests, which potentially overlap, and which are now in fundamental conflict.
Prima facie, most of these core interests of Xi’s Communist Party would now fall in the
‘conflict’ category.”).
16. See, e.g., How to Deal with China, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/01/09/how-to-deal-with-china
[https://perma.cc/GUC8-GJ5X].
17. The
World
Bank
in
China:
Overview,
WORLD
BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview [https://perma.cc/R668-C9R4] (last
visited Nov. 22, 2021).
18. See id.; see also How to Deal with China, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., Katie Holliday, China to Become Largest Economy by 2024, CNBC (Sept.
9, 2014, 6:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/07/china-to-become-largest-economy-by2024.html [https://perma.cc/FX25-VY4R].
20. See How to Deal with China, supra note 16.
21. See The World Bank in China: Overview, supra note 17.
22. Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Economy Surges, and So Does Its Currency, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/business/china-renminbi-yuanstrong.html [https://perma.cc/NGG2-52ZS] (“China is a rare bright spot in an otherwise
ravaged global economy. The coronavirus has been tamed within China’s borders, at least for
now. The nation’s factories are charging ahead full steam. The world’s shoppers—many of
them stuck at home or unable to buy plane or cruise ship tickets—are buying all the Chinesemade computers, televisions, selfie ring lights, swivel chairs, gardening tools and other
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Economic growth nurtures other forms of national power, feeding a
Chinese nation that has steadily expanded its military power.23 By one
estimate, China’s military capabilities may be on par with the United States’s
military capabilities by 2035, and China may be able to overcome the United
States in a military conflict by midcentury.24 For this reason, China has been
dubbed a near peer of the United States and a “rising power,” as opposed to
a “status quo power.”25 For its part, the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy
labels China a “revisionist” state.26 China has shown that it is committed to
creating a “post-West” global order that prioritizes Chinese interests and is
conducive to authoritarian rule.27 As great power competition reenters the
lexicon of policymakers and military strategists, Chinese exceptionalism will
receive renewed attention, setting the stage for conflict between a ruling state
and a rising state.28
More and more, China demonstrates that it is not a standard developing
country, but rather a special developing country and an economic
powerhouse with the potential to emerge as a great power.29 Similar to
Russia, China seeks to create a multipolar world in which China moves to
accouterment of nesting that they can. China’s share of world exports rose to a record 14.3
percent in September, according to data compiled by Jefferies & Company.”).
23. See Steven Lee Myers, China, Its Military Might Expanding, Accuses NATO of
Hypocrisy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
15,
2021,
1:34
PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/asia/china-nato-military.html
[https://perma.cc/YD55-5T24] (stating that “[w]hile China poses virtually no direct military
threat to Europe, which is NATO’s home field, it can now flex its military power in ways that
were unimaginable only a few years ago – not only in Asia, but also globally”); see also
China’s Military Strategy (English), ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA
(May 26, 2015), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/1435159/1435159.htm
[https://perma.cc/A4SR-WJLD].
24. Nancy A. Youssef, China Aims to Outpace U.S. Militarily, American Commander
Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-aims-tooutpace-u-s-militarily-american-commander-says-11607459776
[https://perma.cc/B36CZ4PL] (“China is seeking to invest its economic growth into equaling American military
capabilities by 2035 and aims to be able to defeat the U.S. in an armed conflict by midcentury,
the top U.S. military commander said. ‘They are on a path to try to do that,’ Army Gen. Mark
Milley said of Beijing’s ambitions in an interview at The Wall Street Journal’s CEO Council
summit on Tuesday. ‘It is certainly a significant security challenge for the United States now
and in the years to come.’ To defend against a rising China, the U.S. must develop its own
economic and military power, Gen. Milley said. He warned, ‘We don’t want great-power
competition to turn into great-power war. That would be a disaster.’”).
25. See generally Wang Jisi, China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power
Finds Its Way, FOREIGN AFFS., Mar./Apr. 2011, at 68; see also THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra
note 2, at 6 (“[China] is no longer a status quo power. It has become a revisionist power.”).
26. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 25
(2017).
27. See generally Angela Stent, Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists?, BROOKINGS
INST.
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_russia_china_stent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LV8FSCVQ].
28. See Lionel Beehner & Liam Collins, Dangerous Myths: How the Crisis in Ukraine
Explains Future Great Power Conflict, MODERN WAR INST. AT W. POINT (Aug. 18, 2020), at
5.
29. See CONGYAN CAI, THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TAKING CHINESE
EXCEPTIONALISM SERIOUSLY 85 (2019).
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center stage.30 This is particularly worrisome as Beijing employs
intimidation tactics to erode the sovereign rights of neighboring states in the
South China Sea, bullying others out of offshore resources, asserting
unilateral dominion, and replacing international law with the mantra of
“might makes right.”31 Still, until China’s military powers equal that of the
United States, China will likely pursue its national objectives in ways that
are unarmed but no less adversarial to U.S. interests.32
II. “LAWCRAFT” IN THEORY AND APPLICATION
While China’s economic engine revs, the Chinese Communist Party’s
leadership quietly builds up the nation’s military and postures to peacefully
overtake the United States as a global leader.33 Until that time, however,
armed conflict with the United States would almost certainly be detrimental
to China, and the two nations will remain locked in a “[c]ontest for
[a]llegiance, [n]ot [s]urvival.”34 Key to China’s posturing is an evolving
approach to international law and international dispute settlement, which
represents a sharp departure from China’s historic aversion to transnational
dispute resolution.35 Pundits once agreed that China was “highly critical of
the international legal order led by the West” from the time that the People’s
Republic of China was founded in 1949 through the initiation of the
Reforming and Opening-Up Policy in the late 1970s.36 In this time period,
China was viewed as a revolutionary state that had little to do with the outside

30. See generally Eugene Rumer, Russian Strategic Objectives: It’s About the State, in
CURRENT RUSSIA MILITARY AFFAIRS: ASSESSING AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN STRATEGY,
OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AND MODERNIZATION 1, 1–5 (John R. Deni ed., 2018).
31. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Position on Maritime
Claims in the South China Sea (July 13, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-onmaritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZU-3275].
32. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 2 (“After several decades of US/NATO
dominance following the fall of the Soviet Union, the world appears to have returned to a
period of great power competition that includes limited conflict. And while it may not have
the same fear of nuclear escalation or periphery conflict, there remain new methods of conflict
that need to be understood.”).
33. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 8 (“[China] has rapidly become more assertive. It
is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military,
and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international
system.”).
34. John Sullivan, Trapped by Thucydides? Updating the Strategic Canon for a
Sinocentric
Era,
WAR
ON
THE
ROCKS
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/trapped-by-thucydides-updating-the-strategic-canon-fora-sinocentric-era [https://perma.cc/9MNF-AWBD]; see also THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra
note 2, at 11 ( “China remains for the time being highly anxious about military conflict with
the United States, but that this attitude will change as the military balance shifts over the next
decade. If military conflict were to erupt between China and the United States, and China
failed to win decisively, then—given the party’s domestic propaganda offensive over many
years proclaiming China’s inevitable rise—Xi would probably fall and the regime’s overall
political legitimacy would collapse.”).
35. See generally JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
36. Id.
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international legal order.37 However, as China gradually opened up to the
outside world since the late 1970s, China’s approach to international law
became (and remains) an important concern among international lawyers.38
China has voluntarily adopted legal constraints on its autonomy, partly as
a result of membership in international organizations, but also partly because
Chinese leaders are concerned that international law could become an
impediment to the country’s rise.39 Thus, until now, Chinese leaders have
never attached such “great importance to international law, even though it
might be rhetorical.”40 Importantly, the emerging global system has become
more interconnected and regulated as China steps increasingly into the
international legal framework after several years of insular development,
leading to speculation over how exactly China will interpret and embrace
international law.41 This is critical because the trigger for a great power war
could be a legal dispute based on China’s stubborn belief in a historical right
to islands or shoals in the South China Sea.42 As recently as 2020, the United
States and Australia published official opinions that China’s claims in the
South China Sea are unlawful, posturing for potential future conflict.43
A. “Lawcraft”: China’s Evolving Approach to International Law
China’s approach to international law and its use of international dispute
settlement has long been unclear.44 For many years, China eschewed
international adjudication—with its open and transparent proceedings and
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Remarks at the Opening
Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1327570.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4S5W-DSD5] (calling for a “global Internet governance system” to place
potential limits on states, while ensuring overall accountability from all state actors); Xi
Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Speech at the United Nations Office at
Geneva
(Jan.
18,
2017),
http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm
[https://perma.cc/XA5A-WUWG] (stating that President Xi sounds the alarm of a “double
standard[]” application of international law).
40. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Carry Forward the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation
(June
28,
2014),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3D3T-JH7N] (“In the international society, there should be just one law that
applies to all. There is no such law that applies to others but not oneself, or vice versa. There
should not be double standards when applying the law. We should jointly uphold the authority
and sanctity of international law and the international order.”).
41. CHINA’S SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING xxiii (John Garrick &
Yan Chang Bennett eds., 2016).
42. See generally Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6.
43. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea,
INTERPRETER (Feb. 17, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/howchina-bending-rules-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/NAG5-RZFX] (noting that in 2020,
“both the United States and Australia risked China’s wrath by officially stating that China’s
claims in the South China Sea are unlawful. Other claimants were pleased by this change of
policy, but none voiced it prominently”).
44. See CAI, supra note 29, at 267.
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written judgments—in favor of private negotiation and consultation, tools
which offer China the benefits of excluding outside observers and keeping
the nation’s invocation of international law a secret.45 This risk-averse
approach to dispute resolution has been explained by China’s unique
Confucian-inspired culture, the nation’s historically marginal involvement in
international lawmaking, and the sensitivity of its disputes that frequently
concern human rights abuses and territorial disputes.46 Thus, China had long
been uncomfortable submitting to the voluntary jurisdiction of an
international arbitration tribunal with the power to mandate transparent
proceedings and hand down a binding award that could publicly harm
Chinese interests.47
However, China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001 signaled an evolving approach by China to international dispute
resolution, since WTO membership necessitates a dispute settlement
authority with mandatory jurisdiction over all WTO members.48 Notably,
China has appeared several times before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
as both complainant and respondent.49 China turned heads once again—
renewing questions over its shifting approach to international law—as the

45. See id.
46. Id. at 283 (explaining that “[t]he Confucian litigation-unfriendly culture can perhaps
be considered the first factor” and “the litigation-unfriendly culture is a major reason for
China’s reluctance to submit itself to international adjudication”); see, e.g., Vishnu Som,
Exclusive: China Has Built Village in Arunachal, Show Satellite Images, NDTV (Jan. 18,
2021, 7:42 PM IST), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-has-built-village-in-arunachalpradesh-show-satellite-images-exclusive-2354154 [https://perma.cc/F8Z5-2KW2] (“China
has constructed a new village in Arunachal Pradesh, consisting of about 101 homes, show
satellite images accessed exclusively by NDTV. The same images, dated November 1, 2020,
have been analysed by several experts approached by NDTV, who confirmed that the
construction, approximately 4.5 kms within Indian territory of the de facto border, will be of
huge concern to India. Though this area is Indian territory, according to official government
maps, it has been in effective Chinese control since 1959. However, earlier only a Chinese
military post existed, but this time a full-fledged village that can house thousands has been
built.”).
47. See Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, INST. FOR SEC.
AND DEV. POL’Y, https://isdp.se/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-seadisputes [https://perma.cc/LE84-FGN6] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) (stating that “[i]n terms
of conflict resolution, China states that it prefers to resolve disputes peacefully with individual
claimant states on a bilateral level rather than through arbitration provided by the UN or other
forms of what it sees as ‘imposed’ dispute settlement”).
48. Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, BROOKINGS INST. (May 9,
2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/
[https://perma.cc/3A79-BZJ8] (noting that “China’s membership commits it to comply with
the principles and rules of the international trading system”).
49. See Map of Disputes Between WTO Members, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=CHN&s
ense=e [https://perma.cc/DV7R-3GW8] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); see also Disputes by
Member,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ENL-ERS7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) (citing twenty-four cases in which
China has been the complainant and forty-seven cases in which China has been the
respondent).
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Philippines v. China50 arbitration unfolded. In this high-stakes dispute over
rightful territorial access to the Nansha (Spratly) Islands in the South China
Sea (among other claims), China made clear that it would not always take a
reliable approach to international law in international adjudications.51
Beijing asserted that it would not participate in the hearing, nor would it
enforce the award rendered by the tribunal in favor of the Philippines.52
Thus, it is unclear whether China fully and unquestionably ascribes to the
constraints of binding international law for dispute resolution, particularly
when a tribunal threatens to hand down a decision adverse to Chinese
national interests.53 More worrisome, China’s approach to international law
has historically featured flagrant legal violations held up by a flimsy façade
of legitimacy.54
China’s refusal to even consider arbitration is particularly concerning
because transnational disputes will routinely be settled by tribunals seeking
to enforce international law.55 Particularly, as China seeks greater
involvement in the global fabric of international organizations, it will find
itself increasingly enmeshed in adjudicative forums over disputes large and
small.56 As it gains clout, however, China may also have greater sway in
shaping international adjudication proceedings.57 More importantly, as
China has grown as a global power, so too has international adjudication
grown as a popular method of dispute resolution.58 And while less powerful
countries have limited alternatives in international disputes, more powerful
states enjoy numerous means to address conflicts, giving states like China a
method to potentially flout international adjudication.59

50. See In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 201319, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
51. Isaac B. Kardon, China Can Say “No”: Analyzing China’s Rejection of the South
China Sea Arbitration, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV., no. 2, 2018, at 1, 45,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=alr
[https://perma.cc/89UF-JZJ5] (noting that “this arbitration is not the final Chinese statement
on legal dispute resolution. While there are few reasons to think PRC will abandon a longstanding principle of preferring bilateral ‘negotiation and consultation’ to third party
adjudication, there are many reasons to think it is adaptive”).
52. See Tom Phillips et al., Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case,
GUARDIAN
(July
12,
2016,
1:21
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-caseagainst-china [https://perma.cc/L9VV-3ENA].
53. See id. (in which one expert noted that China would find the arbitration ruling
“unacceptable to the regime” and a Chinese tabloid attacked the ruling as “more radical and
shameless than many people had ever expected”). See generally Julian Ku, China and the
Future of International Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 154 (2012).
54. See Mastro, supra note 43 (stating that the “issue, however, is not that China flagrantly
violates international law—it is that it does so while simultaneously creating a veneer of legal
legitimacy for its position”).
55. See Phillips, supra note 52.
56. See id.
57. See Ku, supra note 53, at 171–73.
58. See id. at 155.
59. See CAI, supra note 29, at 268.
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China’s evolving approach to international law is aptly described as
“lawcraft,” a new term in the lexicon that builds on the term lawfare.60
Lawcraft refers to quasi-magical interpretations of the law that go one step
further than lawfare in which a state not only wields law against adversaries,
but also uses it as an instrument of subterfuge cloaked as gospel.61 Under
this theory, China’s use of law is akin to medieval witchcraft, which was once
accepted as truth but has long ago been discredited. China views its
interpretations of international law as scripture; but some of its legal opinions
are better characterized as bluster and pure subversion of the rule of law.
B. Philippines v. China Arbitration
The Philippines v. China arbitration offers one of the starkest examples of
China’s use of lawcraft to contest jurisdiction, rebuff aggrieved neighboring
states, and flout unfavorable tribunal awards. This arbitration concerned
entitlements in the South China Sea, a massive 3.5 million-square-kilometer
body of water and land features that is of extraordinary geostrategic value
due to the sea’s fishing stock, energy resources, trade routes, and prime
location in the Indo-Pacific Region.62 The sea has become a focal point for
territorial and rights disputes with escalating rhetoric in recent years between
China and several members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.63 China claims
sovereignty over “virtually all South China Sea islands and their adjacent
waters.”64 While China argues its sovereignty is historically established and
uncontested (its so-called “historical territory”), the Philippines firmly
contested absolute Chinese claims and maritime entitlements to various
islands.65

60. See LAWFARE, supra note 5.
61. See Malcolm Jorgensen, China is Overturning the Rules-Based Order from Within,
INTERPRETER (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinaoverturning-rules-based-order-within [https://perma.cc/YP2F-J8C9] (stating that “[b]y
subverting the meaning of the most foundational rules on which the order is based, China may
already be overturning the order from within”).
62. Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA (Dec. 7, 2014) [hereinafter
MFA],
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm
[https://perma.cc/E2A6-JJDQ].
63. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6; WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 10 (stating
that the United States “will reinforce our partnership with Pacific Island states” while
“[r]ecognizing the ties of shared history and sacrifice”).
64. China’s Claims in the South China Sea, INST. FOR MAR. AND OCEAN AFFS.,
https://www.imoa.ph/chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/Q78T-DKR6]
(last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
65. Id.; Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, supra note 47
(referring to Beijing’s designation of the Spratly Islands as part of “China’s historical
territory”); see also CAI, supra note 29, at 295; State Council Info. Off. of the People’s Rep.
of China, White Paper: China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the
Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, CHINA.ORG.CN
(July 13, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of China on Negotiations on the Settlement of the South
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Thus began several rounds of negotiations and an unwritten arrangement
between China and the Philippines to resolve this dispute between
themselves.66 China complained bitterly in 2013 when the Philippines later
initiated arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), filing
fifteen discrete claims and, most notably, seeking a decision entitling the
Philippines to maritime entitlements to the Spratly Islands.67 China argued
that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
mandates that if disputing parties to the convention have agreed to settle a
dispute by any means “of their own choice,” the dispute settlement
proceeding under UNCLOS can only apply “where no settlement has been
reached” by such means.68 Manila countered that its filings with the PCA
were justified and that no settlement had indeed been reached between the
two states, nor were their bilateral talks binding.69 Beijing construed
Manila’s decision to commence arbitration as lawfare, alleging breach of an
unspoken agreement not to turn to a third party for dispute resolution.70
Indeed, China later issued a Position Paper on December 7, 2014, arguing
that the arbitration had no jurisdiction over China.71 Beijing stated that it
would “neither accept nor participate in” the arbitration proceeding,
consistent with its rejection of all international tribunals ruling on China’s
territorial sovereignty over maritime delimitation in the South China Sea.72
Nevertheless, the tribunal found on October 29, 2015, that it had
jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties, and accepted seven out of the
fifteen submissions from the Philippines.73 China again protested the
decision and claimed that the tribunal’s award would be “null and void.”74

China Sea Disputes], http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2016-07/13/content_38870185.htm
[https://perma.cc/PX8W-7563].
66. See Statement of China on Negotiations on the Settlement of the South China Sea
Disputes, supra note 65, ¶¶ 5, 80–83.
67. See id. ¶ 6.
68. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 281, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. Settlement of Disputes by Any Peaceful Means Chosen by the Parties, states:
“Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any
peaceful means of their own choice.” Id., art. 280.
69. See Philippines Seeks U.N. Help to Resolve Maritime Row with China, REUTERS NEWS
(Jan.
22,
2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-chinaidUSBRE90L0C820130122 [https://perma.cc/QH4E-M4DK] (in which Secretary del Rosario
told reporters “[t]he Philippines has exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for
a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime dispute with China”).
70. See Peter Kreuzer, Dealing with China in the South China Sea: Duterte Changing
Course,
PEACE
RSCH.
INST.
FRANKFURT
(2018),
at
4,
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/resources/docs/PRIF-prif0318.pdf [https://perma.cc/E69W-9BX5].
71. MFA, supra note 62 .
72. Id.
73. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2015).
74. Statement on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea
Arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Republic of the
Philippines, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 30, 2015),
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Unfazed, the tribunal proceeded and rendered a final award in favor of the
Philippines on July 12, 2016.75 The arbitrators found that China had no
historic right to resources within the seas falling within its “Nine-Dash
Line.”76 While aggrieved by the decision, China reiterated its nonparticipation.77 China again stated that the award was “null and void.”78
Interestingly, President Rodrigo Duterte won the Filipino presidential
election held on May 9, 2016, only two months before the tribunal made its
final award.79 The Philippines soon issued a Joint Statement with China
taking a softer approach to their dispute, promising renewed negotiations
with them and choosing not to leverage the PCA award to the benefit of the
Philippines.80 President Duterte’s approach raises numerous questions about
whether the new Filipino administration would discredit international
tribunals; whether President Duterte was merely seeking to maintain stability
early in his tenure; whether he worried that the award was unenforceable in
practice; and whether all along the award was pursued as leverage to bring
China to the table for more serious negotiations.81
In any event, the arbitral award in Philippines v. China was shocking and
unprecedented as it levied substantial reputational costs on China.82 If
Manila had not taken a soft stance with Beijing after President Duterte took
office, Beijing could have been forced to dig in its heels on its aggressive
stance or publicly concede its loss to Manila, which is hardly conceivable.83
Certainly, the looming threat of rising reputational costs was a reason for
China’s positive response to President Duterte’s proposal, allowing the
Chinese to save face.84 Ultimately, the Philippines v. China arbitration
provides several key insights into China’s evolving use of international law,
but also offers potential methods to counteract Chinese abuses.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1310474.shtml [https://perma.cc/8UPNY6D3] [hereinafter Statement of China on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility].
75. Award (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, July 12, 2016.
76. See Cecilia Yap, Philippines Says No Compromise on 2016 Sea Victory Against
China,
BLOOMBERG
(July
12,
2020,
6:41
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-12/philippines-says-no-compromise-on2016-sea-victory-against-china [https://perma.cc/SM5R-YFRT] (stating that the “Philippines
will adhere without compromise to a 2016 court victory that nullified China’s claims in most
of the South China Sea”); Mastro, supra note 43 (noting that a top Chinese official described
the Nine-Dash Line as “swoop[ing] down past Vietnam and the Philippines, and towards
Indonesia, encompassing virtually all of the South China Sea”).
77. Phillips, supra note 52.
78. See Statement of China on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note
74.
79. See Harry Krejsa, Rodrigo Duterte’s Turn in the South China Sea, DIPLOMAT (July
15, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/rodrigo-dutertes-turn-in-the-south-china-sea/
[https://perma.cc/M8S4-RH53].
80. See Kavi Chongkittavorn, ASEAN, China After the PCA Verdict: We’re Still Friends,
REPORTING ASEAN (July 23, 2016), https://www.reportingasean.net/asean-china-pcaverdict-still-friends [https://perma.cc/97K2-FAU2].
81. See Krejsa, supra note 79 (noting that President Duterte’s position on the South China
Sea arbitral award remains “puzzlingly inconsistent”).
82. See Kreuzer, supra note 70, at 5.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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III. CHARTING THE BATTLEFIELD: SOLUTION TO COMBAT “LAWCRAFT”
The following solutions materialize as the United States gains a better
understanding of how China approaches and uses international law to
advance its ends, often in ways that are unfair or coercive.85 When asked
about great power competition, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff, stated: “When we think about our competitors, it may
not require exquisite or expensive platforms or long-range missiles—it may
be us just being able to outthink our adversaries. And you can’t outthink them
if you don’t understand them.”86 This statement is consistent with General
Brown’s “Accelerate Change or Lose” campaign, in which greater
understanding of our adversaries is required in order for the United States to
remain competitive long-term.87 General Brown is uniquely positioned to
understand long-term competition with China, as he is the former
Commander of the Pacific Air Forces, where he oversaw more than 46,000
Airmen in China’s regional backyard.88
In long-term conflicts with China and other near peers, headway must be
made in influencing states’ behavior in a way that benefits the United States
and stifles adversarial objectives.89 A primary tool in the U.S. arsenal is
influencing decision-making in the rules-based international order that was
first organized by the United States and its allies.90 In this way, the United
States charts a battlefield for legal dispute resolution that favors U.S.
interests.91 The following solutions are not quick fixes but rather proposals
to gradually counter Chinese lawcraft and maintain American preeminence.
Ultimately, great power competition is unlikely to be measured in a few years
but rather over generations.92

85. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that “[i]n many areas, China’s leaders seek
unfair advantages, behave aggressively and coercively, and undermine the rules and values at
the heart of an open and stable international system”).
86. Oriana Pawlyk, A New Fitness Culture and the Future of Force Design: Gen. CQ
Brown Lays Out Way Ahead for the Air Force, MILITARY.COM (Dec. 28, 2020) (emphasis
added), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/12/28/new-fitness-culture-and-future-offorce-design-gen-cq-brown-lays-out-way-ahead-air-force.html
[https://perma.cc/4NE7HVAN].
87. GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, JR., U.S.A.F., ACCELERATE CHANGE OR LOSE (Aug.
2020),
https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/ACOL_booklet_FINAL_13_Nov_1006_
WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9JK-UE9A].
88. See Pawlyk, supra note 86.
89. See id.
90. See Michael Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order, RAND
CORP.
(2016),
at
53,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1598/RAND_RR
1598.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM5S-W7XB] (stating that U.S. strategy “seeks to manage great
power relations by creating institutions, habits, practices, norms, and implicit or explicit rules
that regulate competition and behavior and provide regularized avenues for cooperation”).
91. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6.
92. Sullivan, supra note 34.
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A. “Multilateralize” Disputes
The United States’s long-term competitive front with China will likely
emerge on the fault lines of global legitimacy and territorial claims.93 Microskirmishes over tangibles like territorial access and intangibles like
reputation and credibility will move the needle in favor of the United States
or China. No single dispute may prove decisive in maintaining a U.S.-centric
view of the world, but legal mechanisms can play a vital role in achieving
“combined critical mass” and preserving the U.S. competitive advantage.94
To begin, U.S. national security stakeholders must acknowledge and
accentuate a multilateral approach to disputes with China.95 By embracing a
community approach rather than an individualist approach, and by relying on
historical alliances, the United States and its allies can isolate and discredit
China in international disputes.96
In practice, the United States and its allies must master and leverage the
rules applicable to disputes before the PCA, as one of the key forums in
which future international disputes will be resolved. For example, Article
17(5) of the PCA Rules (governing procedures before the PCA) permits
joinder of other interested or affected parties to a dispute.97 In the Philippines
v. China arbitration, for instance, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan might have
joined the arbitration and bolstered the stance taken by the Philippines.
While the Philippines won the arbitration even absent joinder, this is in large
part due to the strength of the Philippines’s case and China’s nonparticipation.98 In future disputes, however, joinder may prove to be the
decisive factor. If interested parties do not qualify for joinder, then at the
very least they may seek to file amicus briefs with the PCA, in much the same
way that interested parties file amicus briefs in cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court.
93. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6.
94. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that a U.S. strategy to combat
China must be agreed upon in “sufficiently granular form with the United States’ major Asian
and European treaty allies so that their combined critical mass (economic, military, and
technological) is deployed in common defense of the US-led liberal international order”).
95. See Dan Lamothe, In Japan, Top Biden Administration Officials Attempt to Set the
Tone
on
China,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
15,
2021,
9:36
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/03/15/blinken-austin-china-asiaallies [https://perma.cc/9G67-ZZZ8] (“President Biden’s secretary of state and defense
secretary began a multi-nation tour in Asia with a stop in Japan as they seek to address
concerns about China with allies and partners in the region, and with Beijing directly.”).
96. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that America’s “democratic alliances enable
us to present a common front, produce a unified vision, and pool our strength to promote high
standards, establish effective international rules, and hold countries like China to account”).
97. PERM. CT. ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 17(5) (2012), https://docs.pcacpa.org/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS7G-C7FM] (“The
arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined
in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless
the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined,
the opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any
of those parties. The arbitral tribunal may make a single award or several awards in respect
of all parties so involved in the arbitration.”).
98. See generally supra Part II.B.
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The Philippines fully embraced a “community over individual” approach
in its arbitration with China, arguing that non-parties to the arbitration still
have a community interest in the outcome.99 Indeed, the former Filipino
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert del Rosario, framed the arbitration in the
spirit of a class action lawsuit: the maritime law the Philippines sought to
clarify was important “to all coastal States that border the South China Sea,
and even to all the States Parties to UNCLOS.”100 Secretary del Rosario
believed that the arbitration might enhance the “rule of law in international
relations” and, in particular, the “legal order for the seas and oceans.”101
Thus, a multilateral view to the dispute lent credibility to the Filipino stance
in the arbitration.
Unsurprisingly, China—while standing by its non-participation—
maintained that the disagreement with the Philippines remained
fundamentally bilateral in nature and urged other states in the Indo-Pacific
Region to remain neutral and uninvolved.102 Effectively, China argued that
the two parties to the pre-arbitration talks should remain the only two parties
to the dispute.103 China argued that any efforts by the Philippines to
“multilateralize” the dispute were in bad faith.104 Yet, China eventually
conceded that the South China Sea is an enormous geographical feature that
directly impacts many states, thus certain community interests in the South
China Sea were inherent.105
Admittedly, a few states agreed with China that its dispute with the
Philippines may have been a bilateral disagreement in essence.106 China’s
argument that the arbitration was not truly intended to defend an idealistic
community interest, but rather for the Philippines to defend its own
individualistic interests, resonated with some states.107 Still, China’s stance
could rightly be characterized as lawcraft, in which China cites a technicality
or distracts from the main point in order to shirk responsibility to a weaker
state and coerce a better outcome. In the future, a good-faith approach to
community-based interests in international disputes may tip the scales in
favor of U.S. allies.108 This is critical because other states may yet pursue

99. Alberto F. Del Rosario, Sec. of Foreign Affs., Repub. Of the Phil., Why the Philippines
Brought This Case to Arbitration and Its Importance to the Region and the World (July 7,
2015)
[hereinafter
Statement
of
Secretary
del
Rosario],
https://tokyo.philembassy.net/02events/statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/RWZ2-HZZJ].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. CAI, supra note 29, at 305.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 305–06.
106. Id. at 306.
107. See Wang Wen and Chen Xiaochen, Who Supports China in the South China Sea and
Why, DIPLOMAT (July 27, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-supports-china-inthe-south-china-sea-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/3PTY-R7UN].
108. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 8 (maintaining that multilateral credibility
is of high importance, as China will seek to “diminish the credibility of US power and
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legal action against China. Vietnam, for example, is weighing this course of
action.109 If it does, multilateral support, especially from the United States
and regional partners, will bolster its position and bargaining power.110
B. Remove Politics from Law
In the context of the Philippines v. China arbitration, Secretary del Rosario
repeatedly stated that the Philippines merely wanted to enforce the UNCLOS
and clarify his country’s maritime entitlements.111 If China had shirked its
legal obligations under UNCLOS, he wondered, “what value is there in the
Convention for small States Parties as regards their bigger, more powerful
and better armed neighbors?”112 Thus, the Filipino government stated that it
merely sought a legal judgment rather than a political maneuver to strengthen
its bargaining power against China.113
China countered that the arbitration was motivated purely by politics,
rendering the entire proceeding unlawful and illegitimate.114 There is little
to no evidence to support China’s contention. After all, the UNCLOS
expressly and legally undercuts China’s primary political basis for claims to
the South China Sea: “historic claims” to property going back to the Western
Han Dynasty.115
China’s second basis to allege that the tribunal was illegitimate may carry
more weight. China argued that the tribunal was inherently biased because
the United States and Japan were able to influence the appointment of
arbitrators to the tribunal, thus allegedly stacking the odds in favor of the
Philippines.116 This claim is unsubstantiated, but even the appearance of
influence sufficiently to cause [certain] states currently inclined to ‘balance’ against China to
instead join the bandwagon with China”).
109. James Pearson & Khanh Vu, Vietnam Mulls Legal Action Over South China Sea
Dispute, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 4:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnamsouthchinasea/vietnam-mulls-legal-action-over-south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKBN1XG1D6
[https://perma.cc/A6WV-QERB] (noting that “a senior government official” stated that
“Vietnam could explore legal action among various options in its territorial dispute with
powerful neighbor China in the South China Sea”).
110. See David E. Sanger & Michael Crowley, As Biden and Xi Begin a Careful Dance, a
New
American
Policy
Takes
Shape,
N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/us-china-relations.html
[https://perma.cc/8ED4-PUKA] (“President Biden is engineering a sharp shift in policy
toward China, focused on gathering allies to counter Beijing’s coercive diplomacy around the
world and ensuring that China does not gain a permanent advantage in critical technologies.”).
111. See CAI, supra note 29, at 312.
112. Statement of Secretary del Rosario, supra note 100.
113. See id.
114. CAI, supra note 29, at 312.
115. See Mastro, supra note 43 (“[S]cholars have meticulously catalogued the dubious
nature of this history. And besides, the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
does not grant signatories the right [sic] make claims based on historical legacy, and the
concept of ‘historic claims’ lacks a clear basis in international law.”).
116. MINISTRY OF FOR. AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, Yang Jiechi Gives Interview
to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for the South China Sea
Arbitration (July 15, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1381740.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3KEC-ENKK] (noting that the individual who appointed many of the
arbitrators, Shunji Yanai, the jurist and then president of the International Tribunal for the
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partiality tends to sap legitimacy from the tribunal’s award and tarnishes the
image of the tribunal. In theory, American and Japanese officials might be
motivated to abet the Philippines by selecting a favorable arbitral panel,
thereby containing a rising China.117
International lawmakers and practitioners must take the wind out of
China’s sails by addressing the argument that the Philippines v. China
arbitration and future arbitrations may be biased (or even appear to be
biased). The only way to encourage China and similar states to participate
in future arbitration proceedings that could benefit the United States and its
allies is to appoint fair and unbiased arbitrators to the PCA and other similar
dispute resolution bodies. All parties should desire “clean” panels and
unbiased decision-makers, who would guarantee a fair process. More to the
point, unbiased panels will legitimize future arbitral awards against China.
After ensuring that there is not even the appearance of an unfair panel,
states can then shift the focus to China’s blatant methods of lawcraft. For
example, states can underscore China’s repeated reliance on the “historical
territory” argument (with absolutely no basis in international law) or its utter
refusal to participate in the Philippines v. China arbitration, which China
could have participated in even while maintaining its objection to the
forum.118 This is an explicit Chinese attempt to delegitimize international
legal standards and norms that are hostile to China’s interests—yet another
example of Chinese lawcraft.119 China was not able to show any bias from
the selection of arbitrators that ruled in favor of the Philippines and many of
its claims appear to be wholly lacking in evidentiary support.120 Rather than
entertain fanciful claims from China that do not find any support in law or
the factual record, U.S. allies must cast the spotlight on China’s politicallymotivated lawcraft to hold China’s feet to the fire.121

Law of the Sea (ITLOS), is “a right-wing Japanese intent on ridding Japan of post-war
arrangements”).
117. See id. (noting that “[c]ertain countries outside the region have attempted to deny
China’s sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea through the arbitration”).
118. PERM. CT. ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, (2012), https://docs.pcacpa.org/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2KG-YFYJ] (holding
that an arbitration may go forward pending a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction under Article
23 of the Court’s Rules).
119. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2 (“[China] is no longer a status quo power. It
has become a revisionist power.”).
120. See CAI, supra note 29, at 313 (describing concerns with the possible partiality of
judges on the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but citing no actual evidence to support the
claim).
121. See THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that China will try to “use
China’s growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn
initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests—particularly on
human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, hierarchical,
authoritarian conception of international order under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of
a ‘community of common destiny for all mankind’”).
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C. Embrace Third Party Involvement
China alleged that when the Philippines unilaterally initiated an arbitration
proceeding overseen by a third party, the Philippines violated what was
supposedly a binding commitment not to do so.122 Namely, China argued
that the Philippines had entered bilateral Sino-Philippine agreements and was
bound to settle all relevant disputes through bilateral negotiation to the
exclusion of third parties.123 Accordingly, Beijing stated that “the
compulsory third-party dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS would
not apply.”124
Manila would have no right to seek third-party
involvement.125 Beijing thus claimed that Manila’s submission to the PCA
constituted a “deliberate act of bad faith,” despite evidence to the contrary.126
To be clear, the Philippines made a defensible showing to support its resort
to the PCA, which the PCA itself reviewed and ultimately supported.127
After all, the agreement relating to negotiations between the Philippines and
China was intended to be informal and non-binding.128 More importantly,
the Philippines v. China arbitration could stand as a watershed moment in
which the Philippines and similarly situated states in the Indo-Pacific Region
acknowledge the benefits of non-binding private negotiations that include the
express right to resort to binding arbitration if negotiations eventually break
down. Indeed, bilateral negotiations can even include terms to show implied
consent of the parties to arbitration if initial negotiations are unfruitful. In
this way, states will not be hamstrung if years of private negotiations are
unproductive while other avenues of dispute resolution would be helpful but
are off the table.
Additionally, states can take steps to soften terms that bind parties to
bilateral negotiations unless no settlement has been reached. To this point,
parties can peg the test for abandoning bilateral negotiations to a good faith
standard, deflating any argument that a party is prematurely resorting to
arbitration. It is plainly to China’s advantage to exert its power one-on-one
with opposing states and insist that all bilateral talks indefinitely remain
bilateral. Breaking this outdated paradigm will benefit U.S. allies in the longterm and preclude Chinese arguments that ongoing talks remain private and
well-guarded.

122. CAI, supra note 29, at 316.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, China Adheres to the
Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the
Philippines
in
the
South
China
Sea
(July
13,
2016),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1380615.htm [https://perma.cc/FJ6KXFR3] (stating in Part III that China and the Philippines “have reached consensus on settling
their relevant disputes in the South China Sea” through bilateral negotiation).
126. Id.
127. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (China v. Phil.), PCA Case No. 2013-19,
Oct. 29, 2015.
128. Statement of China on Negotiations on the Settlement of the South China Sea
Disputes, supra note 625, ¶¶ 5, 80–83.
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D. Clarify Entitlements and Sovereignty
The Chinese Communist Party has also insisted that the Philippines
“camouflaged its submissions” to the PCA in the Philippines v. China
arbitration by offering its submissions as isolated, non-sovereignty-related
issues requiring narrow legal interpretation in relation to UNCLOS
provisions, when they were actually related to issues of territorial sovereignty
and maritime delimitation between Manila and Beijing.129 China’s Position
Paper of December 7, 2014, for example, states: “China believes that the
nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime features in the South
China Sea cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of
sovereignty.”130
Yet, states must be free to voice all good faith allegations, knowing that
some of them may later be struck. Ultimately, the Filipino submissions to
the PCA were indeed partly extrajudicial and partly properly before the
tribunal.131 This is largely reflected in the PCA’s acceptance of seven out of
fifteen submissions to the PCA.132 Certain portions of the PCA’s award
regarding, for example, the “Nine-Dash Line” and China’s claim to the
maritime areas of the South China Sea, can properly be characterized as
related to territorial sovereignty. However, the majority of the other claims
before the PCA relate to non-territorial entitlements in the South China Sea,
including high- and low-tide features, rights to the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf near certain banks, rights to exploit living resources
(such as fishing), preservation of the environment, construction activities on
uninhabited reefs, and operation of vessels in a dangerous manner.133
Complaining states must first separate out disputed entitlements from pure
questions of state sovereignty. States will incrementally determine the
demarcation line between the two categories through precedent and
customary international law, as further arbitration cases are decided and cited
in future disputes.134 Next, states must understand the proper forum for
various complaints, avoiding filing sovereignty-related claims while
unabashedly filing entitlement claims. In this way, they can avoid diluting
their overall complaint by inadvertently including claims that cannot be heard
by a particular tribunal. Doing so would disarm China before it is able to use
lawcraft to potentially discredit genuine claims that are properly before
tribunals.
129. See CAI, supra note 29, at 315–16.
130. MFA, supra note 62.
131. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (China v. Phil.), PCA Case No. 2013-19,
Oct. 29, 2015.
132. Id.; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44555, ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND CHINA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(UNCLOS)
1
(2016),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44555/4
[https://perma.cc/WRA4-72UB] (“The tribunal considered China’s arguments and in October
2015 found that it had jurisdiction to rule on 7 of the Philippines’ 15 submissions.”).
133. Award (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, July 12, 2016.
134. See CAI, supra note 29, at 315–16 (noting the dangers of packaging a complaint to
skirt jurisdictional hurdles).
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E. Nudge Rather Than Shove
Finally, the United States and its allies will benefit from a gentler approach
to enforcing international law. Absent such an approach, China may
reflexively rebuff legal proceedings that would put smaller states, many of
them U.S. allies, on surer footing. The uncompromising Chinese stance in
the Philippines v. China arbitration reflects the fundamental Sino-Western
division over the application of international law and agreements to issues
affecting territory and resources.135 Further, this rejection signifies that
efforts from the United States or other powers to pressure China may be hardfought or may even exacerbate existing tensions in the South China Sea.136
A crucial lesson from past dynamics is that premature and unilateral efforts
at conflict resolution through the application of disputed legal instruments or
proceedings may harden China’s resistance and thereby escalate conflict
dynamics.137 This holds especially true if China perceives the invocation of
international arbitration as a Machiavellian strategy aimed at winning a
conflict through law that cannot otherwise be won in other forums. Under
such circumstances, the Philippines and similarly situated states can expect
heightened resistance from China if the Chinese interpret legal proceedings
as the calculated use of lawfare.138
Unquestionably, states should welcome efforts at dispute resolution
through international legal instruments as an alternative to potentially zerosum armed conflict. However, in conflicts over core interests of the
contestants, a hard approach may backfire and contribute to further escalation
if this form of conflict settlement is sought too eagerly by only one party.
The Philippines made a legally shrewd decision to turn to compulsory
arbitration under UNCLOS and submit a case to the PCA that partially
touched upon territorial questions, perhaps knowing that any ruling could
have vast consequences. However, this decision was risky, as it was likely
that this action would engender heightened resistance and confrontation with
a major neighboring state.
Still, it is encouraging that China is trending toward greater acceptance of
outside dispute resolution as tribunals ease many of China’s worst fears.139
135. See id. at 316 (intimating that territorial sovereignty and maritime features are beyond
the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
136. See Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR,
(Aug.
30,
2016),
at
1,
7–8,
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm51ms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BLW5-X9F6].
137. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 8 (maintaining that multilateral credibility
is of high importance, as China will seek to “diminish the credibility of US power and
influence sufficiently to cause [certain] states currently inclined to ‘balance’ against China to
instead join the bandwagon with China”).
138. See Kreuzer, supra note 70, at 5.
139. Harriet Moynihan, China’s Evolving Approach to International Dispute Settlement,
CHATHAM
HOUSE
(March
2017),
at
1,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-29-chinasevolving-approach-international-dispute-settlement-moynihan-final.pdf
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Since China’s economic debut on the world stage, international law has
steadily expanded in both scope and content.140 International relations are
thus governed much more by legal regulation today than they ever were
before.141 In addition, the number of international tribunals with compulsory
jurisdiction have significantly increased, which augments the role of the
judiciary in international law.142 By rendering binding decisions and
conducting their proceedings in a transparent way, international tribunals
“enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the process of international
dispute settlement.”143
In the past, China has preferred to settle international disputes through
private negotiation.144 However, since the 1990s, China has begun to
embrace international regimes, which include dispute settlement mechanisms
with compulsory jurisdiction, such as the UNCLOS and WTO agreements.145
As a result, China is increasingly involved in international adjudication,
whether it likes it or not. As mentioned above, China has become very
confident in bringing complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
As an illustration, in 2007, a total of thirteen disputes were filed in the WTO,
five of which involved China; in 2008, China was involved in one-third of
WTO disputes; and in 2009, China was involved in half of all WTO
disputes.146
Even when China is not a complainant or respondent, the country appears
as a third party before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the International
Court of Justice, or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, by
submitting statements or presenting oral statements in advisory cases.147
And while experts may argue that China has only embraced the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body because it fears hampering trade with its partners—
thus impacting its all-important economic growth—presumably China cares
just as much about fishing and drilling claims near the islands, reefs, and
shoals of the South China Sea.148
The Philippines v. China arbitration is a historic decision because it
signifies smaller states’ growing willingness to exert their rights in a legal
forum against a rising Chinese state. Even if China avoided responsibility in
this arbitration, China will find itself increasingly enmeshed in mandatory
arbitration clauses by virtue of its treaty obligations and growing
involvement in international bodies. The Philippines v. China arbitration is
also noteworthy because China completely rebuffed the arbitration process,
[https://perma.cc/FU85-TMZ7] (noting that China “is increasingly prepared to accept
adjudicative methods of dispute settlement”).
140. CAI, supra note 29, at 317.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 317–18.
144. Id. at 267.
145. See id. at 182–83 (noting China’s gradual acceptance of international organizations).
146. YENKONG NGANGJOH HODU & ZHANG QI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WTO
IMPLEMENTATION AND CHINA’S APPROACH TO LITIGATION IN THE WTO 133 (2016).
147. CAI, supra note 29, at 290.
148. Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 55.
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even as it grows more and more accustomed to settling international disputes
in a judicial forum. The solutions in this Article should provide fodder to the
United States and its allies to ensure that this arbitration proceeding will stand
out as a historic anomaly for China—one in which China used lawcraft to
dodge its legal obligations and lodge unfounded claims. In this way, the
United States can bolster a dispute resolution system that will be maximally
immune to lawcraft and conducive to third party claims to curb potential
Chinese abuses.
CONCLUSION
China rises as a non-Western power within an international system created
largely by Western powers.149 The Chinese Communist Party’s agenda is at
odds not just with the U.S. agenda, but with a Western-oriented system that
is open, integrated, and rule-based, with sturdy political foundations.150 In
short, today’s international order is “hard to overturn and easy to join.”151
The current framework appears able to withstand challenges from Chinese
lawcraft. Yet, as demonstrated by Chinese military exercises in the South
China Sea in early 2021, disputed waters in the Indo-Pacific Region are
turbulent in both the literal sense and the figurative sense.152 By taking
appropriate measures, the United States and its allies can do much more to
force China to clarify its approach to international law and stamp out any
future lawcraft.

149. CAI, supra note 29, at 98.
150. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 9 (“The overriding political objective [of the
United States] should be to cause China’s elite leadership to collectively conclude that it is in
the country’s best interests to continue to operate within the existing US-led liberal
international order rather than build a rival order, and that it is in the party’s best interests, if
it wishes to remain in power at home, not to attempt to expand China’s borders or export its
political model beyond China’s shores.”).
151. G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal
System Survive?, FOREIGN AFFS., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 23–24.
152. Mastro, supra note 43 (“Chinese exercises in the South China Sea last month, and the
strong US response, show these disputed waters will not soon be calm.”).

